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Decentralisation and the Centre Right in the UK and Spain:  
Central Power and Regional Responsibility  
 
Abstract: The British Conservative Party and the Spanish Partido Popular have been 
hostile, at least at times, to devolving greater power to regions. Although both parties 
might be expected to support decentralisation on economically liberal grounds, in fact 
both have found it extremely difficult to reconcile their centre-right economic 
instincts with a deeply ingrained commitment to the integrity of the state. This paper 
explores the tension in conservative and liberal ideology between supporting sub-state 
political responsibility through decentralisation and supporting strong central 
government able to take long-term (and potentially unpopular) decisions in times of 
economic crisis. We examine these two parties in light of Toubeau and Wagner’s 
(2015) framework, finding that market liberalism can be interpreted differently when 
it comes to decentralisation: both the Partido Popular and the Conservative Party have 
both at different times used economic justifications for a strong central state. The 
Partido Popular continues to hold a conservative view of decentralisation and the 
Conservatives have only recently started to link their market liberalism to a 
justification for decentralisation. Thus, whilst it is possible to construct a liberal 
economic case for devolving power away from the central state, one does not 
necessarily follow the other. 
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Statewide political parties in decentralised states face difficult choices when it comes 
to supporting further devolution. They must balance their belief in the integrity of the 
state with the potential electoral costs of being seen to be against a region’s 
aspirations (Meguid 2010). However, beyond immediate political considerations, 
parties will also assess how far decentralisation fits with their wider ideological biases 
(Toubeau and Massetti 2013: 302). In their large-scale study, Toubeau and Wagner 
(2015) find that parties’ positions on decentralisation depend on their ideology. 
Generally, parties on the economic right are more supportive of decentralisation than 
parties on the economic left and culturally liberal parties are more supportive of 
decentralisation than culturally conservative parties. However, crucially, they also 
note that parties in Western Europe rarely present such a neat ideological package. 
Thus, for instance, economically liberal but culturally conservative parties might find 
themselves torn between reluctance to change and the potential economic benefits of 
decentralisation. In this context, Toubeau and Wagner (2015: 115) suggest that 
‘further research should investigate in detail the internal rifts that these contradictory 
ideological motivations may cause and how they are managed by individual statewide 
parties’.  
We take up this challenge and explore in detail the philosophical tensions 
about decentralisation in two centre-right parties: the British Conservative Party and 
the Spanish Partido Popular (PP), which can be translated as the ‘party of the people’. 
Our case study approach allows us to add a temporal dimension to the study of these 
parties’ ideology. Both parties have found it difficult to reconcile ideology and 
territorial management. Toubeau and Wagner (2015) hypothesise that centre-right 
parties will support decentralisation on the ideological grounds that it will shrink the 
state (actually, the size of the central government), citing the ideology of the German 
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Free Democrats and US Republicans (Toubeau and Wagner 2015: 100) and the 
examples of Swiss and German fiscal equalisation reforms (Toubeau and Wagner 
2015: 102). In practice, the Conservatives and the PP initially opposed 
decentralisation because they feared that such a move would exacerbate, not 
ameliorate, existing divisions within the UK and Spain. While both parties have since 
come to accept decentralisation, the Conservatives have recently gone further, arguing 
for greater decentralisation across the whole of the UK in order to reduce the size of 
the British state and promote fiscal responsibility. The PP, however, has moved to re-
centralise Spain, arguing that the lack of fiscal responsibility on the part of the 
regional governments has forced the central government, at a time of economic crisis, 
to take such action.  
Our examples of centre-right parties in the UK and Spain, countries that have 
grappled with the demands of sub-state national minorities in recent decades, reveal 
the ideological tension between liberalism and conservatism that exists inside parties 
labelled by Toubeau and Wagner as ‘culturally conservative’ (2015: 99). Our 
comparison illustrates more generally the priority that centre-right parties attach to 
strong central government and the challenge posed to the unitary state by sub-state 
national minorities who seek greater autonomy or secession for their regions. The 
tensions present in some multinational states may be exacerbated during tough 
economic times when governments may be required to take unpopular economic 
decisions, times when the central government may seek to assert its need for strong 
powers, which centre-right parties, perhaps more than parties of the left, will insist 
upon. 
We argue that while Toubeau and Wagner are correct to point to the 
importance of ideology when trying to understand the party policy, we must also 
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consider carefully how centre-right parties interpret their commitment to market 
liberalism and conservatism. Parties on the economic right may be generally more 
likely to support decentralisation, but we find that these two right-wing parties have at 
different times been content to argue for a strong central state as the only means by 
which market liberal policies can be effectively delivered.  
The paper begins by outlining an analytical framework for viewing the 
philosophical influences on political parties’ territorial stances. After an overview of 
how the decentralisation of power happened in the UK and Spain, it then examines 
the centre right in detail, outlining the tensions in both parties between liberal and 
conservative ideologies. We go on to consider how the Conservative Party and the PP, 
when dealing with the challenges of decentralisation in the UK and Spain, have 
confronted sub-state nationalism and how they have tried to promote fiscal 
responsibility, an issue that has become more prominent since the recent economic 
crisis affecting both countries. We discuss specific tensions in both parties and 
examine how the parties have managed the ideological tensions surrounding 
decentralisation. Understanding these motivations is especially important in the 
context of the Scottish independence referendum and Catalonia’s recent moves 
towards secession or greater autonomy. We acknowledge that other factors (including 
party competition and organisation) will play a role in determining party positions on 
decentralisation, but we focus here on party ideology. 
Our examination of the responses of the Conservatives and the PP to the 
challenges of sub-state nationalism and economic crisis reveals that the Conservatives 
have embraced liberalism to a greater extent than their Spanish counterparts in the PP, 
with the Conservatives retaining many of the liberal policies pioneered in the 1980s 
by Margaret Thatcher. This perspective of wanting to reduce the size of the state has 
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helped shape its current policy on Scottish devolution, in which the Conservatives 
have sought to promote fiscal responsibility at the Scottish Parliament by actually 
expanding the body’s tax powers to keep more of the revenue raised in Scotland 
within that sub-state nation. The PP, on the other hand, is responding to economic 
crisis by preferring to re-centralise Spain, at least as far as the country’s finances are 
concerned, citing fiscal irresponsibility on the part of regional governments. Thus, 
there is not necessarily a tension for centre-right parties between market liberalism 
and lack of support for decentralisation. 
 
Analytical framework: Conservatism and liberalism 
Toubeau and Wagner (2015: 115) note that ‘culturally conservative parties on the 
economic right [can be] divided between economic efficiency and nationalism.’ In the 
cases of the PP and the Conservative Party, we reframe this as a potential tension 
between liberalism and conservatism. Neither the British Conservative Party nor the 
Spanish PP can be described as purely ‘culturally’ conservative parties in a 
philosophical sense. Rather, they contain elements of both liberalism and 
conservatism. These two traditions (present in most parties of the centre right) may 
suggest different logics of action when it comes to supporting or opposing 
decentralisation. For the market liberal, sub-state responsibility might promote 
competition, limits on central government power and efficiency; Toubeau and 
Wagner point to this desire for efficiency when developing their hypothesis ‘The 
more economically right wing a party is, the more it will support decentralization’ 
(2015: 101), and others have noted the appearance of an economic discourse in the 
literature on decentralisation in recent years (Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall 2008: 58-
59). For the conservative, such potential benefits have to be weighed against the 
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accumulated wisdom of present arrangements, scepticism about change and a concern 
to preserve central government authority.  
This could, therefore, be a key ideological tension on the centre right when it 
comes to decentralisation. This section explores this dualism in both parties. We 
present a framework for analysing the potential ideological motivations of the 
Conservatives and the PP according to: (1) ideology and the state; (2) ideology and 
the economy; and (3) ideology and decentralisation. 
 
1. Centre-right ideology and the state 
Girvin sees conservatism as an ‘attempt to justify what exists and to challenge the 
advocates of change’ (1994: 4). For Green (2002: 281), there are three fundamental 
elements of conservatism: intellectual imperfection, traditionalism and organicism. 
Conservatives reject the idea that societies or constitutions can be perfected and are 
highly sceptical about grand plans to improve them or change people’s behaviour. In 
general, they will always prefer the present level of (necessarily imperfect) happiness 
or utility to a hypothetical and untested higher level that any innovation claims to 
offer. This is also rooted in a belief in the (often unseen) wisdom of inherited practice. 
Institutions and traditions are greater than their surface level appearance might 
suggest: in fact, they contain an essential wisdom that has been distilled over time. 
However, this wisdom (and the stability in society which flows from it) is a both a 
precious and precarious gift. For Burke, it is a covenant to be preserved from 
generation to generation, including for those who have yet to be born (Norman 2013). 
The delicate ecosystem of institutions and practice is hard won but easily lost. Change 
must thus be organic and go with the grain of existing practices and traditions. 
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Thus, writing about a British Conservative context, O’Hara (2011) distils two 
central principles for conservative thought: the knowledge principle and the change 
principle. The knowledge principle captures a conservative’s scepticism about what 
we can know. Knowledge is local and it is contingent. A conservative rejects the idea 
that theories about how societies work can hold across different times and contexts 
(O’Hara 2011: 33). This limited knowledge leads naturally to the change principle: if 
we have only an extremely limited understanding of the consequences of change, then 
we should be extremely cautious when considering it. 
 
2. Centre-right ideology and the economy 
Alongside this conservatism, however, both parties contain strong elements of 
liberalism. For Greenleaf (1983: 193), for instance, there is a dualism in British 
Conservatism between economic liberals and conservative paternalists. Similarly, 
among the 2008 party manifesto’s statement of principles, the PP speaks of its links to 
the tradition of Spanish liberalism arising from the 1812 Constitution of Cádiz and 
cites its commitment to a free-market economy, though one with policies that ‘make 
prosperity more just’ (Partido Popular 2008: 8-9). Liberalism emphasises the primacy 
of the individual over the state. Girvin further identifies liberalism with egalitarianism 
and the ‘universalist commitment to the moral unity of the human species, and the 
possibility of improvement and progress’ (1994: 13). Seeing conservatism as the 
‘outgrowth of conflict with liberalism’, Girvin argues that ‘It is the values of the new 
society, usually described as liberal, which the right and conservatives generally wish 
to transform, change or destroy’ (1994: 14). 
In this way, for some authors, liberalism and conservatism can co-exist 
together coherently (see, for instance, Willetts 1992: 92-108; Greenleaf 1983; Freeden 
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1996: 348-393). Others see clear tensions. O’Hara (2011: 218-219), for instance, 
notes two central sources of disagreement. First, following her sceptical view of 
knowledge, the conservative believes that there is no way of knowing the optimal 
system for running an economy; for the liberal, the best way is the free market. The 
liberal view also applies in the market of ideas and traditions: if people are free to 
follow traditions and ideas and choose to do so, then they will survive. If not, they 
will rightly cease. The conservative, on the other hand, believes that an invisible hand 
beyond the market needs to guide society. Second, while the liberal is content to 
allow the market to weigh the costs of change and the benefits of innovation, a 
conservative is concerned that markets may neglect what is important and trample on 
the wisdom contained in tradition.  
 
3. Centre-right ideology and decentralisation 
Conservatism does not naturally predispose those on the centre right to reject 
decentralisation. On the contrary, local knowledge is extremely important for a 
conservative (O’Hara 2011: 33). A conservative would also generally welcome 
localism, so that decisions are taken closer to the people they affect (O’Hara 2011: 
142). However, a conservative might reject any move towards greater decentralisation 
within a state on the grounds that the change is too radical and interferes with long-
established governing practices. The imposition, for instance, of a tier of government 
with no historical or cultural basis purely for administrative convenience would be 
difficult for a conservative to accept. However, if decentralisation moved with the 
grain of generally established practice and became demanded from the bottom up, 
then it might be justified as organic and necessary. 
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European liberals have been in conflict with conservatives over sub-state 
nationalism, having been associated with a ‘commitment to liberation and self-
determination’ for minorities in the 19th and early 20th centuries (Girvin 1994: 50). 
Liberals also clashed with conservatives over the extension of the franchise and basic 
social reforms during this time period, supporting change, but once this was achieved 
(about the 1920s in Europe), liberals tended to side with conservatives when it came 
to the larger question of redistribution (Girvin 1994: 71). For liberals, the advantages 
of greater decentralisation are clearer. Devolution of greater fiscal responsibility, for 
instance, might promote the kind of tax competition that will lower rates. Both 
conservatives and liberals could agree with the idea that forcing lower tiers of 
government to raise the taxes they spend could foster greater political responsibility.  
 Our analytical framework for examining the ideology of these two parties is 
summarised in Table 1 below. However, before we examine each party’s response to 
these ideological tensions, we first look briefly at the history of decentralisation in the 
UK and Spain. 
Table 1 about here 
 
Decentralisation in the UK and Spain 
In examining the cases of the UK and Spain, we are interested in the intersection 
between pressures for decentralisation and existing party institutions and ideology. 
Our investigation of devolution in the UK and Spain uses similar cases of 
decentralisation (with some exceptions), focusing on two similar parties of the centre 
right. This approach is consistent with the ‘most similar systems’ design (Przeworski 
and Teune 1970) or the ‘comparable-cases strategy’ (Lijphart 1975). Both the UK and 
Spain have moved from being highly centralised states to being at least somewhat 
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decentralised in asymmetrical ways. Our case study approach gives us the scope to 
examine how ideological motivations may have changed over time, ending up with 
different outcomes: while the Conservatives initially oppose decentralisation but later 
come to embrace it, the PP remains more concerned about the integrity of state and 
committed to centralisation. 
In the UK, Northern Ireland was granted devolution of power after the 
independence of the rest of Ireland in the 1920s, but devolution was suspended in the 
early 1970s as a result of the conflict between Unionist and Nationalist communities, 
with a renewed attempt at devolution introduced in 1998 (Bogdanor 1999). This wave 
of devolution also included Scotland and Wales in 1999, as well as London in 2000, 
though devolution to other regions of England failed to materialise. In Spain, however, 
the entire territory of the state has seen devolution of power, resulting in 17 
comunidades autónomas (autonomous communities) and two autonomous cities in 
Africa. According to Gunther and Montero (2009: 80), Spanish devolution ‘grants 
very extensive government powers and resources to sub-national units’, making ‘the 
autonomous communities of Spain more powerful than almost any other sub-national 
government structure in Europe’. Therefore, the institutional comparison between the 
UK and Spain is not perfect, but in both cases, decentralisation was prompted by 
demands from sub-state minorities and was resisted, at least to some extent, by parties 
of the centre right. 
 In the UK, devolution has largely been limited to the ‘Celtic Fringe’ of 
Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. London has an assembly and an elected mayor, 
and a few other English cities have chosen elected mayors, but since the North East 
region of England rejected devolution in 2004, no further regional devolution has 
occurred. While the 1970s saw a suspension of Northern Irish devolution, the decade 
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also saw British politicians consider devolution as a way to deal with an increase in 
Scottish nationalism (Bogdanor 1999: 119). The issue proved divisive for Labour in 
Scotland, however, with some members of Parliament (MPs) arguing that devolution 
would increase the likelihood of Scottish secession. Ultimately, the UK Labour 
government held referendums on devolution of power to Scottish and Welsh 
assemblies in 1979, and both failed to pass. Labour had a chance to reflect on the 
issue while the Conservatives governed for the next 18 years and refused to consider 
the matter. Eventually Labour and the Liberal Democrats, working together with the 
Scottish Constitutional Convention, came up with the blueprint for Scottish 
devolution, overwhelmingly approved by Scottish voters in 1997 after Labour won 
the UK election. Devolution was also approved in Wales, but by a much closer 
margin, and the Good Friday Agreement paved the way for a new attempt at 
devolution in Northern Ireland the following year. 
 Devolution in the UK has been asymmetrical in terms of the powers granted to 
the institutions established: the Scottish Parliament and the Northern Ireland 
Assembly had primary legislative powers from the outset, while the National 
Assembly for Wales only had secondary legislative powers until a 2011 referendum 
gave it primary legislative powers. The Scottish Parliament began to receive revenues 
from the personal income tax collected in Scotland from 2017. All three institutions, 
however, do have powers over policy areas like health, education, agriculture, and the 
environment in their respective sub-state nations, while Westminster retains power 
over ‘high politics’ UK-wide areas like defence and foreign policy, as well as 
macroeconomic policy and the social security system (pensions and benefits, which 
are uniform across the UK). Officially, Westminster remains sovereign, so it can 
legislate in any policy area for any part of the UK. It retains control of constitutional 
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matters and can alter the terms of devolution, but in practice this has occurred in 
consultation with the people of the sub-state nation concerned. 
As Bogdanor puts it (1999: 3), devolution in the UK ‘seeks to preserve intact 
that central feature of the British Constitution, the supremacy of Parliament’, differing 
from federalism, in which ‘the authority of the central or federal government and the 
provincial governments is co-ordinate and shared’. Devolution in Spain, at least 
technically speaking, is not federal either: the Spanish constitution explicitly rules it 
out, saying in Section 145, ‘Under no circumstances shall a federation of Self-
governing Communities be allowed’ (Spain 1978: 65). Spanish decentralisation 
differs from federalism in that devolution of power took place through bilateral 
negotiations between the Spanish state and each individual region over a period of 
time, in the asymmetry of devolution of power across the regions, and in the open-
ended nature of the devolution process (Gunther and Montero 2009: 77). Yet most 
observers say that Spain’s ‘state of autonomies’ has federal attributes, with the 
autonomous communities in charge of many domestic policy areas. García-Cuevas 
Roque notes (2012: 69) that one could say ‘that the delivery of public services and 
benefits associated with the Welfare State is the principal assignment that has been 
transferred to the Autonomous Communities’. 
 Spanish devolution has become less asymmetrical since the initial transition to 
democracy, in which recognition of Spain’s diversity was a crucial part. As Gunther 
et al. (2004: 280) argue, democratisation ‘would have to be accompanied by a parallel 
transition from a unitary and rigidly centralized state to a decentralized political 
structure based upon autonomous regional governments’. While demands for 
autonomy were greatest among those regions with prior experience of self-
government before the Spanish Civil War – the Basque Country, Catalonia, and 
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Galicia – and extensive powers were granted to these regions, the constitution allows 
all regions of Spain to have devolution of power and eventually to achieve high levels 
of autonomy (Gunther et al. 2004: 286). As Bukowski observes (1997: 95), 
‘ethnic/nationalistic factors may be quite significant during the early years of the 
transfer of authority, but once institutional units are established at lower levels, this 
provides a mobilization point and incentives for developing a regional consciousness 
even in areas that have no historic basis for such feelings’. Therefore, while some 
autonomous communities do still retain greater powers than others (for example, the 
tax collection system used in the Basque Country and Navarre), the trend has been 
towards less asymmetry (Gunther et al. 2004: 295). The PP and the Socialists, in 
general, have sought to reduce asymmetry in devolution (‘café para todos’, or coffee 
for everyone), while the regionalist parties have resisted this (Keating and Wilson 
2009: 540). 
 Spain’s PP is a much younger party than its British counterpart, the 
Conservative Party. Starting out as the Alianza Popular (AP) in 1976, the party 
(changing its name to the PP in 1989) lost elections to the Union of the Democratic 
Centre and later the Socialists, but in 1996 it finally won power under the leadership 
of José María Aznar, who had managed to move the party to the centre and improve 
its organisation (Astudillo and García-Guereta 2006: 400-01). The party went from 
running a minority government dependent upon support from regionalist parties to 
winning a majority in 2000, with consequences for its regional policy: not having to 
rely upon outside support, the PP resisted further decentralisation. The PP lost power 
to the Socialists in 2004, not regaining power until 2011.  
The British Conservatives, on the contrary, governed the UK for most of the 
twentieth century, including an 18-year stretch from 1979 to 1997 in which it 
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benefited from divisions in the Labour Party, eventually leading to a split that created 
the Social Democrats who later merged with the Liberals to form what is now the 
Liberal Democrats. In contrast to these two left-wing parties, the Conservatives were 
hostile towards decentralisation, resisting calls for devolution until the party’s defeat 
in a landslide victory for Labour in 1997. The Conservatives and the PP (when it was 
the AP) did not originally want devolution of power from the centre to the regions, 
but once it became a reality, the parties found ways to deal with the situation, as later 
sections will describe. Both parties have tried to protect the state from the threats of 
sub-state nationalism, and both have promoted the cause of fiscal responsibility.  
 
Ideological tensions in the PP and the Conservative Party 
Although both exhibit similar tensions between conservatism and liberalism, the 
interplay between these ideologies has played out differently for the Conservatives 
and the PP. While the Conservative Party moved decisively in an economically liberal 
direction in the 1980s (and retains a dominant market liberal element of thought 
today), the PP has not abandoned a sense of conservatism in the economic sphere to 
the same extent, with increased liberalism being forced upon the party by economic 
necessity. 
 
Conservative Party 
1. The state 
Despite a clear commitment to market liberalism in the economic sphere, British 
Conservatism has never really fallen for a liberal agenda to reduce the power of the 
state. As Norton (1996: 76) points out, ‘Conservatives have never rejected strong 
government’. Although Margaret Thatcher’s economics were undoubtedly liberal, her 
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instincts towards the state were in many ways much more in the conservative tradition. 
Thus, Gamble (1994) summarises her government’s attitude as a commitment to the 
‘free economy and the strong state’. The vast power accorded to a British 
Government with a parliamentary majority was required to overcome resistance in 
order to set the people free in the economic sphere. As Smith (1996: 148) 
summarises: 
Institutions that challenge Parliament, even an executive-dominated one, 
threatened the rule of law and the will of the nation. Within Thatcherism is a 
deep distrust of intermediate institutions such as local government, trade 
unions and even the media, and so it is proper to weaken these groups. For 
Thatcherism, the contract of governance is between the parliamentary state 
and the individual. 
This makes support for decentralisation difficult, even if a Thatcherite Conservative 
could accept longer-term arguments about tax competition and sub-state fiscal 
responsibility. Nevertheless, current Conservative policy on Scottish devolution calls 
for greater tax-raising powers to be transferred to the Scottish Parliament, something 
that has been quite contentious and difficult for the party to accept (Scottish 
Conservative Party 2014). It has taken the party over a decade to marry its liberal 
economic ideology with thinking about devolution. The prospect of the Scottish 
independence referendum in 2014 forced the party (alongside the other statewide 
parties) to come up with ideas about the future governance of Scotland if it remained 
in the UK. Thus, an ambiguous position on further powers for the Scottish Parliament 
was no longer an option. Not only was a more powerful Scottish Parliament infinitely 
preferable to independence; it also became increasingly untenable for the Scottish 
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Conservatives to claim to be in favour of fiscal discipline and low taxes when they 
were not prepared to trust the Scottish Parliament to do something about it. 
 
2. Economy 
The post-war Conservative Party was largely committed to an accommodation 
between labour and the market. From the 1950s therefore, most Conservatives 
accepted that ‘the state sector was to be administered, not dismantled’ (Gamble 1974: 
63). This implied a rejection of laissez faire liberal economics and an acceptance that 
the state would have a significant role to play in economic management. Having 
initially opposed the Labour Party’s creation of the National Health Service, it came 
to accept it as a central part of the welfare state. However, from the 1970s, the 
dominant view in the Conservative Party has become much more economically liberal. 
Margaret Thatcher thought that the excessively interventionist state was at the heart of 
the UK’s economic problems and that the government had to withdraw entirely from 
certain areas, including industry. Green (2002: 290) suggests Margaret Thatcher’s 
leadership fundamentally tilted the ideological outlook of the Conservative Party 
towards liberalism: ‘As the Conservative Century came to an end, it seemed that even 
if the Conservative party had survived, Conservatism had not’. Similarly, for Garnett 
(2003) and Beech (2011), debates about the ideological direction of the Conservative 
Party after 1997 took place between competing forms of liberalism, rather than 
between conservatism and liberalism. 
 
3. Decentralisation 
In May 2014, the Scottish Conservative Party published a report that recommended 
further powers be devolved to the Scottish Parliament, particularly over taxation 
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(Scottish Conservative Party 2014). This was generally considered to be a watershed 
moment for the party and marked the first time since the 1970s that it had formulated 
its own proposals for devolution, following on from a referendum on further 
devolution in Wales, in which prominent Welsh Conservatives campaigned for a Yes 
vote. The Scottish referendum on independence forced the party to produce a vision 
for Scotland if it remained in the UK. In the intervening period, the Conservatives’ 
attitude to devolution had become increasingly strident and hostile, culminating in its 
campaign against the establishment of a Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly in 
referendums in 1997. Even after the devolved parliaments and assemblies were 
established, the party leadership still had to contend with sections of the party who 
were not reconciled to the permanence of the new arrangements (Convery 2013). 
However, the Conservative Party was instrumental in the early 20th century in 
the creating the conditions for devolution to evolve. It established the Scottish Office 
in the late 19th century and gradually added to its powers over the next 100 years. 
Indeed, in the 1940s and 1950s, the party regularly played the ‘Scottish card’ and 
accused the Labour Party of, for instance, the centralisation of control away from 
Scotland, particularly over governance arrangements for the newly nationalised 
industries (Mitchell 1990). This form of ‘administrative devolution’ formed the basis 
for the powers that the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly would eventually 
inherit. Conservative opposition to devolution hardened and became a mainstream 
position only in the 1980s. Margaret Thatcher saw it as her duty to quietly ditch the 
party’s commitment to devolution under Ted Heath in order to provide the Scots and 
Welsh with benefits of Thatcherism from the centre: ‘Ted had impaled the party on an 
extremely painful hook, from which it would be my unenviable task to set it free’ 
(Thatcher 1993: 36). 
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The liberal economic tendency in British Conservatism might be expected to 
predispose it towards greater decentralisation. Institutions that are responsible to their 
electorates for the taxes they spend might have a strong incentive to lower them; 
competition between sub-state regions might be expected to encourage lower tax rates 
and greater efficiencies. However, as we have seen, Thatcher’s market liberal 
instincts nevertheless retained a deep hostility to institutions outside the core 
executive. These were viewed as silos of social democratic ideology that were an 
obstacle to the economic liberation of the UK (Gamble 1974). The Thatcher 
governments had frequent disputes with local authorities and took powers to cap their 
tax-raising powers. The Thatcher governments also famously abolished the Greater 
London Council in 1986. Under John Major, devolution was presented as a threat to 
the unity of the UK (UK Government 1992). 
 Beyond the ideological considerations, this thinking also reflects a sense that 
the UK’s problems in the 1980s were so severe that they could only be dealt with by a 
strong and decisive central government. New Right thinkers in the Conservative Party 
were deeply affected by the defeat of Edward Heath’s Conservative Government at 
the hands of the trade unions. Central government authority was therefore central to 
an agenda of taking on vested interests in order to implement market liberal reforms 
in the economy and the public sector. In the end, the market liberalism that became 
mainstream policy in the Conservative Party under Thatcher and beyond never 
engaged seriously with the possibilities of decentralisation because these were seen as 
at best a distraction and at worst a hindrance to a project that required the full force of 
the unitary British state. The irony of setting people free in the economic sphere 
through the centralisation of power in the political sphere was not lost on some New 
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Right thinkers who worried about the excessive power of bureaucracy (Smith 1996: 
149). 
Devolution, therefore, from the Conservative perspective, might be better 
justified as an organic and bottom-up change that goes with the grain of existing 
British practice. It can be presented as a conservative reform. As Scottish identity 
became more salient in the 1970s and as the Scottish party system became more 
distinct, an appropriate conservative response might have been to see the need to 
grant some form of devolved assembly (Melding 2009). Such a position was famously 
declared to be the ‘settled will’ of the Scottish people in the 1990s. Moreover, this 
might be argued to mark the logical end point of a process that the Conservative Party 
had started in the late 19th century by creating the Scottish Office. However, the 
Conservative Party instead viewed devolution as a fundamental shift in the nature of 
the British state. While they could readily accept further administrative devolution 
(more powers to the Welsh and Scottish Offices, alongside more time to discuss 
Welsh and Scottish issues at the Westminster Parliament), they came to see 
devolution as a step too far.  
Viewing devolution as a revolution, rather than a conservative evolution of the 
British constitution, presented fundamental problems for the Conservative Party. 
Instead of seeing the logic of adding a democratic element to powers that were 
already devolved administratively, Conservatives instead became fixated on whether 
this would lead to the break-up of the UK and the anomalies posed by Scottish MPs 
being able to vote on English legislation when English MPs were unable to do 
likewise (the so-called ‘West Lothian Question’). The majoritarian British Political 
Tradition, involving strong central government (under which the Conservatives had 
thrived in the 20th century) would be threatened (Richards 2011) and the central 
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doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty would potentially be undermined by devolution. 
Thus, neither a conservative nor a liberal case for devolution found much traction in 
the Conservative Party of the 1980s and 1990s. 
However, alongside these ideological tensions, much baser desires were also 
at work. The unitary United Kingdom allowed the Conservative Party to govern 
Scotland and Wales without a majority in those nations. As long as the Conservative 
Party achieved a majority across the UK as a whole (regardless of the number of seats 
in won in Scotland and Wales), it could appoint Conservative ministers to the Scottish 
and Welsh Offices and implement Conservative policies. As Conservative support in 
Scotland and Wales began to decline in the 1970s, electoral considerations started to 
play a part in Conservative thinking about the constitution. Under devolution, it was 
unlikely that the Conservatives would be in government (alone or at all) in Scotland 
and Wales. The best way to see Conservative policies in Scotland and Wales was 
therefore to retain the status quo. This was a view shared not only by Conservative 
elites at the centre, but was also strongly held in the Scottish and Welsh Conservative 
Parties, and it was linked to a benevolent sense that Scotland and Wales had to be 
saved from themselves and needed the strong centre to take on vested interests in 
order to set their economies free (Mitchell and Convery 2013). 
 
Partido Popular 
1. The state 
In Spain, manifestos from the PP and its predecessor, the AP, reveal an organic view 
of the state. ‘A State is the result of a historical and sociological process. For this 
reason, we propose an option decidedly reformist, by means of evolution, 
modification and preparation of the necessary laws’, declares the AP in its 1977 
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manifesto (Alianza Popular 1977: 23) 1 . On the cusp of Spain’s transition to 
democracy, the party insists upon defending the ‘unity of the homeland, as well as the 
recognition of the personality and autonomy of its regions’ (Alianza Popular 1977: 
15). The PP has maintained the AP’s belief in importance of the unity of Spain, noting 
in its 2015 manifesto that the country’s constitution would turn 40 during the next 
legislative session, and that ‘Spain is today a great nation because we have known 
how to construct unity from our differences’ (Partido Popular 2015: 139). The party 
praises the constitution for being ‘the best formula for articulating unity and diversity’ 
(Partido Popular 2015: 141). 
As Verge argues, ‘the historical relationship between conservatism and an 
organic conception of the Spanish nation leaves the PP no room for the recognition of 
plurinationality or institutional asymmetry, as these are considered to weaken the 
(Spanish) national community and the authority of the state’ (2013: 331). In Spain, 
the centre-right has gone from outright opposition to devolution in the early years of 
Spanish post-Franco democratisation to presiding over a significant expansion of 
powers devolved from the centre to the autonomous communities in the late 1990s. 
This apparent change of heart did not mean that the PP accepted the arguments for 
decentralisation based on a recognition of the diversity of Spain, however. Instead, the 
PP wanted to make the autonomous communities as equal as possible, reducing the 
asymmetry in order to maintain the primacy of the Spanish nation. 
 
2. Economy 
The PP has liberal economic tendencies, though perhaps not to the extent seen in the 
Conservative Party, and these have developed relatively recently, largely as a result of 
Aznar’s efforts to bring Spain into the euro, and as a consequence of the recent 
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economic crisis. Under Aznar’s leadership, the PP ‘progressively proposed a policy 
mix of liberal economic policies and sustainable welfare social policies’ (Astudillo 
and García-Guereta 2006: 411). Research into the alleged neoliberalism of the PP has 
concluded that while the party did reduce the size and activity of the state via 
privatisation, liberalisation and tax cuts, with deficit and debt reduction to satisfy 
European Union criteria, it did not display a ‘doctrinal commitment to the neo-liberal 
agenda’ in most of its dealings with unions or the welfare state (Astudillo and García-
Guereta, 2006: 412), with both unemployment and inflation dropping and relatively 
peaceful labour-management relations. Aznar was no Thatcher. As Astudillo and 
García-Guereta argue, ‘the PP expected to make its profile on economic issues 
distinctive by superior performance rather than by offering markedly different or 
specific policies’, which the government hoped would earn for it ‘a reputation for 
economic and political competence’ (2006: 413).  
 More recently, however, the PP has shown more of an interest in liberal 
economic policies, perhaps as a consequence of the economic crisis that began in 
2008. The party’s 2011 election manifesto focuses heavily on its proposed economic 
policy, citing the need to improve employment levels and put the public finances in 
order, stating that the ‘PP offers an economic policy which will permit Spaniards to 
be in conditions of competing successfully in the global knowledge economy’ (2011: 
23). The manifesto goes on to claim that the party would focus on macroeconomic 
stability in the context of (European) Economic and Monetary Union; 
competitiveness, flexibility and unity of the markets; and social and welfare mobility, 
with halting the structural deficit, reforming the financial sector and labour laws, and 
improving the business climate also cited as plans (Partido Popular 2011: 25). The 
party’s 2015 manifesto continued along the same track, putting employment at the top 
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of the agenda and claiming credit for creating almost a million jobs, with the goal of 
20 million Spaniards in employment by the year 2020 (Partido Popular 2015: 6). ‘The 
key is creating jobs. It’s jobs, jobs and more jobs’, according to the PP’s manifesto 
(Partido Popular 2015: 13). At the start of the government’s term in office, however, 
unemployment actually rose to 27 per cent as austerity measures were implemented, 
and the bailout of major banks led to the rise of parties like Podemos (‘we can’) as a 
result of public alienation from the political establishment (Muro 2015: 25).   
Since its 2011-15 term in government, the PP continued to appear wedded to 
liberal economic policies, though the party linked economic growth to the financing 
of the welfare state, saying in its 2015 manifesto that ‘growth is the basis of your 
wellbeing’ (Partido Popular 2015: 6). The party’s manifesto also states its 
commitment to ensuring that all Spaniards, wherever they may reside, enjoy access to 
the same level and quality of public services (Partido Popular 2015: 80; 141). This 
position does not appear consistent with Toubeau and Wagner’s (2013: 100) 
assumption that economically right-wing parties are more comfortable with the 
inequality that may result from decentralisation than their left-wing counterparts who 
will prioritise redistribution over efficiency. 
The economic crisis affected relations between Madrid and the autonomous 
communities because the Spanish government collects taxes across the state (apart 
from in the Basque Country and Navarre) and then funds the regional governments, 
which have significant expenditure needs due to the extensive services they are 
responsible for. Many regional governments ran up big debts, with Catalonia having 
one of the biggest, which hit 21% of gross domestic product in the first quarter of 
2012, forcing the Catalan government to seek help from Madrid (Gardner 2012a). 
Spain’s severe economic problems have been exacerbating the relationship between 
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Madrid and the regional governments, with the Catalans particularly angry about their 
claim that the wealthy region, outside the special fiscal arrangement enjoyed by the 
Basque Country and Navarre, transfers up to ten times more per capita to the Spanish 
state than the wealthy Basque Country (Gardner 2012b). This perspective on the 
economic situation leads Catalans to reject Madrid’s charges of fiscal irresponsibility. 
Nevertheless, critics allege that the PP government wanted to take back some powers 
from the autonomous communities, citing the economic crisis and Spanish state’s 
need to bail out its regions (Gardner 2012a). 
 
3. Decentralisation 
As Gunther et al. point out, the AP opposed devolution from the outset, but as the 
party came to power in some of the regional governments, its position changed, with 
former leader Manuel Fraga – a politician from the Franco regime who had previously 
been a strong opponent of devolution – becoming ‘a militant Gallego regionalist in 
the 1990s’ as regional head of government, ‘demanding high levels of autonomy as 
well as extensive transfers of both policy jurisdictions and fiscal resources from the 
central government’ (2004: 332-3). Another regional premier (of Castile and León), 
Aznar, would go on to become the party’s first prime minister of Spain. Under Aznar, 
the PP ran a minority government from 1996 to 2000, depending upon support from 
regionalist parties who held the balance of power in Congress. While the PP did 
preside over greater devolution during its time in power, Grau Creus notes that the 
party appears to see a distinction between administrative decentralisation and policy-
making decentralisation, with the regions’ proper role consisting of carrying out the 
policies made in Madrid (2005: 268-9).  
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The PP won an absolute majority of seats in the 2000 election, leaving the 
party free to govern without the support of regionalist parties. Observers noted a shift 
in the PP’s position on regional policy towards greater centralisation, as well as ‘a 
renewed form of Spanish nationalism’ (Verge 2013: 330). This shift was most 
apparent at the statewide level, where a manifesto study found the PP to be more pro-
centralisation than the Socialists in the 2000 statewide election, though nearly all of 
the PP’s regional branches in regional elections between 2000 and 2003 produced 
manifestos that were more favourable to regionalism (Maddens and Libbrecht 2009: 
223). Freed by his parliamentary majority from having to work with regionalist 
parties seeking greater autonomy from the centre, Aznar could argue that devolution 
had been completed (Astudillo and García-Guereta 2006: 414). The PP lost power in 
2004 but returned in late 2011 under Mariano Rajoy, winning a majority of seats and 
introducing ‘a centralising agenda realigning the party’s territorial policy with its 
traditional centralist and nationalist ideology’ (Verge 2013: 330). The economic crisis 
and resulting huge debts for regional governments created an opportunity for Rajoy’s 
PP government to respond with centralisation, saying that ‘the recession required 
technical measures that assured “harmonization” and “rationalization” – words that 
peripheral nationalisms interpreted as euphemisms’ (Muro 2015: 25).  
 Reform of the regions’ statutes of autonomy, a process taking place during the 
early twenty-first century, presented opportunities for the PP to reveal its view on 
how decentralisation in Spain should evolve, showing that the party opposes special 
treatment or privileges, particularly when it comes to the matter of the distinctiveness 
of the sub-state nationalities – the term ‘nation’ applies only to Spain, in the PP’s 
view. The two most contentious examples were those of the Basque Country and 
Catalonia, two ‘historic nationalities’ that had experienced regional autonomy in the 
 26 
1930s and which continue to seek a great deal more autonomy than that held by other 
regions. This approach presented a challenge to both the PP and the Socialists, who 
together rejected the 2004 Basque plan for what has been described as ‘confederal 
model that recognised the sovereignty of the Basque Country and granted it almost 
total autonomy’ (Muro 2009: 456). A less radical statute proposal from Catalonia in 
2005 stumbled over the issues of the wording used to describe the autonomous 
community (the term ‘nation’ was not allowed by Madrid) and the question of tax 
collection and Catalonia’s contribution to the rest of Spain (Muro 2009: 460). The PP 
objected strongly to the Catalan proposal, partially because of the party’s ideological 
opposition to asymmetry (which is somewhat less of an issue for the Socialists), and 
partially because of partisan electoral reasons (Keating and Wilson 2009: 543).   
Another issue where the PP has demonstrated its opposition to asymmetry 
more recently is language policy. Autonomous communities are allowed by Section 3 
of the constitution to have official languages that co-exist with Castilian Spanish, 
which has official status throughout Spain, with citizens having ‘the duty to know it 
and the right to use it’ (Spain 1978: 10). Several autonomous communities have 
granted official status to languages besides Castilian Spanish. The PP’s 2008 
manifesto complained that ‘language cannot be converted into a factor of 
discrimination or a cultural barrier for restricting rights, impeding geographical 
mobility, or breaking the unity of the market’ (Partido Popular 2008: 38), proposing 
that ‘all Spaniards be guaranteed the right to use Castilian Spanish’ and ‘use and 
study in Castilian Spanish’ throughout the education system (Partido Popular 2008: 
39). Aznar gave a speech on this topic at Georgetown University four years after 
leaving office, complaining that the Catalan government has relegated Castilian 
Spanish to the status of a ‘foreign language’ in the region’s schools, with ‘linguistic 
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commandoes’ checking to see if Catalan is being used in the private sector since the 
1998 introduction of a law giving preference to the language (Aznar 2008). 
 Using the PP as an example, Toubeau and Wagner (2013: 101) observe that 
cultural conservative parties ‘generally praise traditional values such as “the nation”, 
identify with a single national political community and regard the recognition of 
cultural diversity as a source of erosion of the integrity of the national community and 
democratic citizenship’. The party’s focus on language policy is indicative of the 
importance of what could be seen as a culturally conservative issue, reflecting the 
PP’s response to sub-state nationalism: the nation consists solely of Spain, with the 
‘historic nationalities’ relegated to a lower status than that of nations. Critics see this 
as a Spain dominated by politics in Madrid as well as by the Castilian language and 
culture. They worry about an increase in ‘Spanish nationalism’, pointing out recent 
central government intentions to ‘Spanish-ise’ Catalan pupils by interfering with the 
region’s bilingual education policy (Gardner 2012c). The PP’s approach contrasts 
with the Conservative Party’s acceptance of the UK as a multinational state in which 
Scotland, for example, is seen as a distinct nation within the larger entity of the UK, 
and where education policy in Scotland has been separate from that of England.  
 
Decentralisation and the right 
Based on our analysis, we suggest three central conclusions about devolution and the 
centre right in the UK and Spain. First, there have been few attempts in the PP or the 
Conservative Party to discuss decentralisation in the context of conservative or liberal 
ideology. The market liberalism of the Conservative Party in the 1980s and 1990s was 
combined with an attachment to a strong state that could take on vested interests. It 
was therefore difficult for advocates of devolution to insinuate themselves into 
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debates about the best way to bring about economic revival. Only latterly, in 2014, 
did the Scottish Conservatives (with the UK party’s blessing) begin to see the liberal 
advantages of devolving income tax to Scotland. This argument about responsibility 
also applied to the 2011 Welsh devolution referendum and the Conservative-led 
government’s recent moves towards devolving more tax-raising powers to the Welsh 
Assembly. Similarly, it proved difficult to make a conservative case for devolution in 
the Conservative Party because of its longstanding ideological attachment to the 
Westminster model of British governance that implied parliamentary sovereignty and 
a centralised state. Although the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly 
essentially only added a democratic element to powers that were already devolved to 
the Welsh and Scottish Offices (often under Conservative governments), it still 
seemed to most of the party to be too revolutionary a change. Its unionism was based 
on Scotland and Wales having privileged access to the UK centre, rather than their 
own self-rule powers.  
 In Spain, the PP has recently been pushing for a more centralised state which 
it claims would be better able to handle the country’s severe financial problems in the 
wake of the 2008 economic crisis. Reducing power for the regional governments is 
being portrayed by the PP as a way to make Spain more ‘viable’, rather than 
experimenting with promoting fiscal responsibility through greater power transfers 
(with the hope that voters will hold regional governments to account, as the 
Conservatives are attempting in Scotland and Wales). While the PP was responsible 
for extending devolution of power to the autonomous communities in the past, this 
was done mainly in order to reduce the asymmetry in power that was seen as 
privileging the ‘historic nationalities’, something that worked against the PP’s 
conservative view of Spain. 
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 Thus, although some parties of the right may indeed be torn between on the 
one hand a commitment to free market economics and a conservative view of the state 
on the other, this need not necessarily be the case. In these two examples, the parties 
have at different times seen a strong central state as a prerequisite for the 
implementation of liberal economic policies. For the Conservatives under Thatcher, 
for instance, it is arguable that conservatism and liberalism were aligned with little 
outward contradiction. 
Second, beyond ideology, issues of electoral politics and party management 
also play a role here. Even if the Conservatives had been persuaded by a liberal or 
conservative case for devolution, they would have had to confront the possibility that 
they would struggle to be in power in the new devolved institutions created. Electoral 
weakness therefore fed into concerns that Scottish and Welsh legislatures would roll 
back the hard-won economic achievements of the 1980s under centre-left 
governments. For the PP, however, early electoral successes in elections to the new 
autonomous communities allowed the party to come to accept, perhaps grudgingly, 
the ‘State of Autonomies’ that it (as the AP) had initially opposed. Because the party 
had become a major political actor in nearly all of Spain’s regions, there was no 
problem with its goal of extending devolution for the sake of reducing asymmetry 
across the autonomous communities because the party’s branches there would also 
benefit. 
Third, times of economic crisis bring these issues to a head. In the 1980s, the 
Conservative Party felt that a strong lead from the centre was the only way to take on 
the vested interests that were holding back the UK economy and undermining 
parliamentary authority. In Spain, the PP has been using the current economic 
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problems to take control of regional finances, claiming that the ‘viability’ of the State 
of Autonomies is at stake. 
In the wider study of decentralisation and party ideology, therefore, we have 
examined two potentially deviant cases. These parties’ positions on the economic 
right have led them to justify different policy directions on decentralisation at 
different times. Thus, it would be wrong to argue that the ideological logic of 
economic liberalism always tends towards support for decentralisation (or, at the very 
least, that it must always cause tensions or contradictions in centre-right parties). For 
some parties of the centre right, economic freedom must be imposed and protected by 
a strong central state that can effectively withstand the protests of special interests. 
Similarly, support for decentralisation from conservative parties might be entirely 
consistent with that ideology if it is an attempt (as in the case of the PP) to conceal the 
unique position of some sub-state regions. In short, cultural conservatism might be 
used to justify decentralisation and economic liberalism might equally be used to 
construct a case for something resembling a unitary state. Ideology is useful as a 
guide to the positions of centre-right parties, but it might be interpreted in unexpected 
ways. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has analysed how the Conservative Party and the PP deal with tensions in 
their ideological outlook when it comes to decentralisation. Having feared the 
potential threat to the state’s territorial integrity posed by decentralisation, the parties 
were forced to come to terms with the reality of this constitutional change. When 
difficult economic circumstances brought about austerity, however, the Conservatives 
came to support greater autonomy in order to promote fiscal responsibility, while the 
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PP went the other direction, attempting to re-centralise Spain in order to rein in what 
the party believed to be irresponsible spending. In both cases, fiscal responsibility in 
the face of economic problems was the prescription, but the outcomes were different. 
The Conservatives have come to accept decentralisation in the UK, not only in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, but also in England, where they have been 
promoting the creation of ‘city regions’, while the PP has shifted from its record of 
greater decentralisation of power to Spain’s regions to a policy of re-centralisation. 
Toubeau and Wagner (2015: 115) are correct to note that analysis of party 
preferences on decentralisation need to go beyond the left-right dimension: the 
Conservatives and the PP are parties that combine centre-right economic views and 
cultural conservatism. However, we have also shown that these potentially conflicting 
ideologies do not always tilt these parties towards positions on decentralisation that 
we might expect. Further detailed case study research is required in order to 
determine whether the PP and the Conservatives are deviant cases or whether support 
for decentralisation is closely linked to a liberal economic outlook in parties of the 
centre right.  
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Table 1 
 
Conservatism Liberalism 
State power 
Organic state development Small state encourages 
personal freedom 
Economy 
The free market risks 
trampling on traditions 
The market is the best way 
of allocating resources 
Decentralisation 
Decentralisation may risk 
destroying the inherited 
wisdom of the constitution 
Fiscal and political 
responsibility could 
encourage lower taxes and 
greater efficiency 
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